Hub-and-Spoke Free Trade Areas by Deltas, George et al.
 
 
 
 
DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES 
 
 
 
     ABCD 
 
www.cepr.org 
 
 
Available online at: www.cepr.org/pubs/dps/DP5960.asp
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 5960 
 
HUB-AND-SPOKE  
FREE TRADE AREAS 
 
 
George Deltas, Klaus Desmet  
and Giovanni Facchini 
 
 
  INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
 
 
 
ISSN 0265-8003 
HUB-AND-SPOKE  
FREE TRADE AREAS 
George Deltas, University of Illinois 
Klaus Desmet, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid and CEPR 
Giovanni Facchini, Università degli Studi di Milano, University of Illinois and CEPR 
 
Discussion Paper No. 5960 
November 2006 
Centre for Economic Policy Research 
90–98 Goswell Rd, London EC1V 7RR, UK 
Tel: (44 20) 7878 2900, Fax: (44 20) 7878 2999 
Email: cepr@cepr.org, Website: www.cepr.org 
This Discussion Paper is issued under the auspices of the Centre’s research 
programme in  INTERNATIONAL TRADE. Any opinions expressed here are 
those of the author(s) and not those of the Centre for Economic Policy 
Research. Research disseminated by CEPR may include views on policy, but 
the Centre itself takes no institutional policy positions. 
The Centre for Economic Policy Research was established in 1983 as a 
private educational charity, to promote independent analysis and public 
discussion of open economies and the relations among them. It is pluralist 
and non-partisan, bringing economic research to bear on the analysis of 
medium- and long-run policy questions. Institutional (core) finance for the 
Centre has been provided through major grants from the Economic and 
Social Research Council, under which an ESRC Resource Centre operates 
within CEPR; the Esmée Fairbairn Charitable Trust; and the Bank of 
England. These organizations do not give prior review to the Centre’s 
publications, nor do they necessarily endorse the views expressed therein. 
These Discussion Papers often represent preliminary or incomplete work, 
circulated to encourage discussion and comment. Citation and use of such a 
paper should take account of its provisional character. 
Copyright: George Deltas, Klaus Desmet and Giovanni Facchini 
CEPR Discussion Paper No. 5960 
November 2006 
ABSTRACT 
Hub-and-Spoke Free Trade Areas* 
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the volume of trade between member countries. In a three--country, three--
good model, if two countries have a free trade area, and both sign a similar 
agreement with the third, trade between the two decreases, and welfare rises 
in both. However, if only one of them signs an FTA with the third, a hub-and-
spoke pattern arises. If the two spokes have a comparative advantage in 
different goods, trade between the two countries in the initial FTA increases, 
with welfare rising in the hub and falling in the spoke. We provide evidence 
consistent with the theoretical model when studying the experience of Israel. 
JEL Classification: F11 and F13 
Keywords: free trade areas, hub-and-spoke, israel and trade volumes 
George Deltas 
Economics Department  
University of Illinois, Urbana-
Champaign   
1206 South Sixth Street   
Champaign, IL 61820   
USA   
Email: deltas@uiuc.edu  
 
For further Discussion Papers by this author see: 
www.cepr.org/pubs/new-dps/dplist.asp?authorid=164977 
Klaus Desmet 
Departamento de Economía  
Universidad Carlos III   
28903 Getafe   
Madrid   
SPAIN   
Email: klaus.desmet@uc3m.es  
 
 
For further Discussion Papers by this author see: 
www.cepr.org/pubs/new-dps/dplist.asp?authorid=144849 
Giovanni Facchini 
Dipartimento di Scienze Eonomiche,  
Aziendali e Statistiche   
Università degli Studi di Milano   
Via del Conseratorio 7   
20122  Milano   
ITALY   
Email: facchini@uiuc.edu  
 
For further Discussion Papers by this author see: 
www.cepr.org/pubs/new-dps/dplist.asp?authorid=157388 
 
 
 
* This paper is an output of the Research Training Network 'Trade, 
Industrialisation and Development' (Contract No. HPRN-CT-2002-00236) 
funded through the Improving Human Potential activity of the European 
Commission's Fifth Framework Programme. We thank Elena Mattevi for 
sharing her data and participants at the European Trade Study Group 
meetings in Dublin 2005 and the CEPR/ERWIT Workshop in Vienna 2006 for 
helpful comments. Financial aid from the Spanish Ministerio de Educación y 
Ciencia (SEJ2005-05831) and the Fundación Ramón Areces is gratefully 
acknowledged. 
 
Submitted 24 October 2006 
 
 
HUB-AND-SPOKE FREE TRADE AREAS∗
George Deltas†, Klaus Desmet‡and Giovanni Facchini§
October 2006
Abstract: This paper analyzes how the sequential formation of free trade areas
affects the volume of trade between member countries. In a three–country, three–
good model, if two countries have a free trade area, and both sign a similar agreement
with the third, trade between the two decreases, and welfare rises in both. However, if
only one of them signs an FTA with the third, a hub-and-spoke pattern arises. If the
two spokes have a comparative advantage in different goods, trade between the two
countries in the initial FTA increases, with welfare rising in the hub and falling in the
spoke. We provide evidence consistent with the theoretical model when studying the
experience of Israel.
JEL Classification: F11, F13.
1 Introduction
The last decades have witnessed an explosion in the number of preferential trade agreements
around the globe. According to the World Trade Organization, 230 are in force today, many
more are planned and they overwhelmingly take the form of free trade areas. More than half
of these agreements have been signed after 1994, and today trade between preferential partners
makes up nearly 40 percent of total global trade. On average, each trading entity belongs to
six preferential agreements, while this number rises to thirteen for developed northern countries
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(World Bank 2005). This complex network of free trade agreements has been colorfully compared
to a ‘spaghetti bowl’ by Bhagwati (2002), and while its existence has been extensively documented
in the literature, its implications for trade volumes are not yet fully understood.
The image of a spaghetti bowl vividly illustrates how one cannot look at a country pair in
isolation when trying to understand the effects of a free trade area (FTA). One should consider
not only whether there is an FTA between a country pair; the wider network of trade agreements
should also be taken into account. This same point has been emphasized by Anderson and
Wincoop (2003) who highlighted that it is relative, rather than absolute, trade barriers that
matter. To see this, suppose that two countries, with no trade restrictions between them, expand
free trade to a third country. In the framework of Anderson and Wincoop (2003), this leads to
a drop in trade between the country pair. In spite of continuing to have free trade, in relative
terms trade between the original partners has become less free, because trade barriers with the
third country have been reduced.
In this paper we argue that introducing free trade with a third country need not reduce
trade between a country pair if this leads to a hub-and-spoke arrangement. Although relative
trade barriers go up between the original partners, trade may actually expand. To clarify the
difference with the previous result, an example may help. As a starting point, assume that Cuba
has established a free trade area with Jamaica. If both countries sign an FTA with Venezuela,
trade between Cuba and Jamaica decreases. This is the result emphasized by Anderson and
Wincoop (2003). If, instead, only Cuba signs an FTA with Venezuela, then Cuba becomes a
hub. In a world without rules of origin, it is easy to see that trade is likely to increase. Cuba
could import, say, coconuts from Venezuela, and re-export them to Jamaica. Although this would
lead to de facto free trade between all three, to reach that outcome, all trade would have to pass
through Cuba, dramatically increasing trade volumes. Of course in reality FTAs are bound by
rules of origin. However, even then an indirect form of re-exporting can occur: rather than re-
exporting Venezuelan coconuts to Jamaica, Cuba could export home grown coconuts to Jamaica,
and substitute its domestic consumption by Venezuelan coconuts.
Though this example is based on a pure exchange economy, the central intuition carries over
to a production economy. In that case, what would matter is the factor content of trade. In a
hub-and-spoke situation, Cuba’s imports from Venezuela would have the same factor content as
its exports to Jamaica. In other words, Cuba would import “coconut-intensive” goods produced
2
in Venezuela, and export home produced “coconut intensive” goods to Jamaica. Under this
generalization, rather than the imports and the exports being identical goods, it would be enough
for the factor content of the imports and the exports to be the same.
A first contribution of this paper is to formalize the trade effects of hub-and-spoke arrange-
ments. We consider a three-country three-good endowment economy in the spirit of Bond, Riez-
man, and Syropoulos (2004). To fix ideas, we call these countries North, Middle and South. Each
country has a comparative advantage in a different good. We study three possible configurations:
the bilateral FTA case (FTA between Middle and North, with MFN tariffs between the others),
the hub-and-spoke case (FTA between Middle and North and between Middle and South, but
MFN tariffs between North and South), and the multilateral free trade case (FTAs between all
three).
Starting off with an FTA between North and Middle, we want to understand how expanding
free trade to South affects the volume of trade between North and Middle. If only Middle signs
an FTA with South, we have a hub-and-spoke arrangement. We find that trade between North
and Middle increases. Welfare improves in both countries. If, instead, both countries sign an
FTA with South, we have multilateral free trade. Compared to the bilateral FTA, we find that
the volume of trade between North and Middle declines, with welfare rising in both countries.
This result shows that introducing free trade with a third country has different effects on
trade volumes, depending on whether trade expands across the board, or whether, in contrast, it
leads to a hub-and-spoke situation. If a pair of countries jointly introduce free trade with a third
country, trade between the pair declines. However, if only one of them signs an FTA with the
third country, we get a hub-and-spoke situation, and trade between the pair goes up.
A second contribution of the paper is to provide empirical evidence, consistent with these
hub-and-spoke effects. The network of agreements signed by Israel in the last three decades
makes for an appropriate testing ground. In 1975 Israel established an FTA with the European
Union. In 1985 it signed a similar FTA with the United States. This gave rise to a hub-and-spoke
configuration, with Israel being the hub, and the EU and the US being the spokes. Consistent
with our theoretical framework, we find that this increased trade between Israel and the EU by
nearly 30%, in spite of leading to greater relative trade barriers between the two. In 1993 Israel
signed a third agreement, this time with EFTA. Since the EU already had free trade with EFTA,
this led to multilateral free trade between Israel, the EU and EFTA. Consistent with the theory,
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we find that this decreased trade between Israel and the EU.
We are not the first to explore the intricacies of hub-and-spoke arrangements.1 Of particular
interest is Kowalczyk and Wonnacott (1992), who analyze hub-and-spoke effects in the context
of NAFTA. While this paper offers an excellent overview of the different possibilities, it falls
short of providing a detailed theoretical model. Puga and Venables (1997) analyze how hub-and-
spoke arrangements affect the location of industries in a Dixit-Stiglitz world. In contrast to our
work, their focus is not on trade volumes, but on agglomeration in production. In particular,
they show that a hub-and-spoke structure might hurt the spokes by making location in the hub
more attractive. Saggi and Yildiz (2006) use instead a three-country oligopoly model to study
how membership in multiple free trade arrangements might result in higher welfare for the hub,
compared to free trade. However, they do not discuss the effects on trade volumes.
Recent work has analyzed the endogenous formation of regional agreements and the optimal
setting of tariffs.2 Given that our focus is mainly on assessing the hub-and-spoke effects on trade
volumes, we do not explicitly model the tariff formation process. In other words, we take the
external MFN tariff as given, and assume the formation of an FTA to imply the complete removal
of any trade barriers amongst member countries. Furthermore, following Bond, Riezman, and
Syropoulos (2004), we assume the formation of an FTA to be exogenous.3
Our work is complementary to the large empirical literature that, starting from the pioneering
contribution of Tinbergen (1962), has used the gravity equation to assess the effects of preferential
trading arrangements on bilateral trade volumes.4 To the best of our knowledge the existing
literature has so far failed to thoroughly investigate the importance of hub-and-spoke effects.5
This is not surprising, because in standard gravity models the mechanism we describe does not
arise. For the hub-and-spoke effect to be relevant, two conditions need to be satisfied. The spokes
1Early contributions can be traced back to Wonnacott (1975) and Wonnacott (1982).
2See, for instance, Ornelas (2005).
3It is worth pointing out that, in our modeling framework, if policy decisions are undertaken in each country by
a social planner, the existence of prior agreements would not block the formation of a global free trade agreement.
This is because the aggregate welfare of a country increases with the number of agreements it signs, regardless of any
agreements signed between the other countries. In reality, of course, frictions and political economy considerations
may well prevent the attainment of global free-trade. Therefore, examining trade configurations short of global free
trade is not only reasonable, but given the observed patterned of trade agreements, of direct policy relevance as
well.
4See, for instance, Frankel (1997), Baier and Bergstrand (2006) and Ghosh and Yamarik (2004).
5An exception is De Benedictis, De Santis, and Vicarelli (2005). However, they do not analyze how adding new
spokes affects trade between the hub and existing spokes. Instead, they study how the effect of an FTA between
two countries on their trade differs, depending on whether they are spokes or not.
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must have a comparative advantage in different goods, and the hub must be endowed with some
of the goods the spokes specialize in. If this is the case, the hub can satisfy its consumption of a
certain good by importing it from one of the spokes, and thus exporting its own endowment of
that same good to the other spoke. Although the hub imports and exports the same good, its
imports are ‘made in one of the spokes’ and its exports are ‘made in the hub’. In contrast, the
monopolistic competition setup in gravity models has each variety being produced in only one
country, and ignores issues of comparative advantage. Since all varieties are equally substitutable,
the hub can no longer offer its goods to one of the spokes as a substitute for the exports of the
other spoke. As a result, the possibility of the hub doing indirect arbitrage vanishes. This explains
the absence in the standard gravity model of an increase in trade through the hub.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces a simple three-country model
of comparative advantage to explain the mechanism at hand. Section 3 contains the main results
of the paper, comparing trade volumes and welfare levels under different trading arrangements. In
section 4 we develop a methodology to empirically evaluate the presence of hub and spoke effects
and apply it to the case of Israel. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 The model
Consider a simple endowment economy with three countries: North (N), South (S) and Middle
(M). Countries are indexed by superscripts j = N,S,M . Each country is populated by a unit
mass of homogeneous agents. Three goods are exchanged in this economy, indexed by subscripts
i = 1, 2, 3. The endowments of the three countries are
yN = (1 + α, 1, 1)
yS = (1, 1 + α, 1)
yM = (1, 1, 1 + α) (1)
Note that each country has a comparative advantage in a different good. In this sense, countries
are ‘complements’ to each other.6 This endowment economy can be thought of as the reduced
form of a production economy with factors of production in fixed supply and sector-specific.
6The case of spokes being ‘substitutes’ will briefly be discussed in Section 3.2.
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Preferences are identical across countries, and we assume them to be Cobb-Douglas of the form:
u(c1, c2, c3) = c1c2c3 (2)
Trade barriers take Samuelson’s ‘iceberg’ cost form. In particular, a tariff τ implies that 1+ τ
units of a good have to be shipped for 1 unit to arrive.7 Let qji be the price received by a producer
in country j for each unit i he produces, and pji the price paid by a consumer in country j for
each unit i he consumes. Because we will be considering free trade areas accompanied by rules
of origin (ROOs), qji may be different from p
j
i . For instance, if M has two separate FTAs with
N and S, the price it pays for its imports of good 1 from N could very well be different from the
price it receives for its exports of good 1 to S.
We can then rewrite the income of the representative consumer in the three countries as
follows:
IN = qN1 (1 + α) + q
N
2 + q
N
3
IS = qS1 + q
S
2 (1 + α) + q
S
3
IM = qM1 + q
M
2 + q
M
3 (1 + α) (3)
Consumption of good i in country j is:
cji =
Ij
3pji
(4)
The starting point of our analysis is a bilateral FTA between two countries. Our goal is to
analyze how trade liberalization with a third country affects trade between the original two. To
do so, we distinguish between two cases. On the one hand, if both countries expand free trade to
a third country, we have a multilateral FTA. On the other hand, if only one of the two countries
liberalizes trade with the third country, we have a hub-and-spoke arrangement. As we will now
see, these two cases will lead to diametrically opposed effects on trade between the original two.
2.1 The starting point: bilateral FTA
Under a bilateral FTA we assume that two countries, say N and M, have free trade between
each other, while uniform MFN tariffs exist among all other countries. We take those MFN tariffs
7Although this assumption is made here only for tractability, it is well suited to describe an environment in which
non-tariff barriers are becoming increasingly important as a trade policy instrument. In fact, non-tariff barriers,
while introducing costly distortions to trade flows, only lead to very impartial rent capturing for the country that
imposes them.
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to be nonprohibitive.
We start by simplifying the price structure. In the absence of a hub, there cannot be a price
difference between what producers receive and what consumers pay in a given country, so that
qji = p
j
i . Normalization and symmetry allow us to write p
N
1 = p
N
3 = p
M
1 = p
M
3 = 1. Since M and
N import good 2 from S, it follows that pN2 = p
M
2 = p
S
2 (1 + τ). Prices in S are p
S
1 = p
S
3 = 1 + τ
and pS2 . To simplify notation, we write p
S
2 = p2.
To solve out for the only unknown price level p2, we use the trade balance between N and S:
(1 + τ)(cS1 − 1) = p2(1 + τ)(cN2 − 1) (5)
Combining this equation with the expressions for income (3) and consumption (4) allows to
determine p2:8
p2 =
3 + α+ τ
3 + α+ 2τ
(6)
A first goal of our model is to compare trade flows across different trading arrangements. For
the comparative statics exercises we carry out later in the paper, it is useful to compute trade
between N and M as a share of their incomes. The value of trade between the two is (cN3 − 1).
Using the expressions for income (3) and consumption (4) gives the shares(
xNM
IN
)bilateral
=
(
xNM
IM
)bilateral
=
α2 + 3α(1 + τ) + τ(2 + τ)
3((3 + α)2 + (8 + 3α)τ + τ2)
(7)
A second goal of our model is to compare welfare across trading arrangements. For the bilateral
FTA case the welfare levels of the representative agents in the three countries are(
uN
)bilateral
=
((2 + α)(3 + α+ 2τ) + (1 + τ)(3 + α+ τ))3
27(1 + τ)(3 + α+ τ)(3 + α+ 2τ)2(
uM
)bilateral
=
((2 + α)(3 + α+ 2τ) + (1 + τ)(3 + α+ τ))3
27(1 + τ)(3 + α+ τ)(3 + α+ 2τ)2(
uS
)bilateral
=
((3 + α)2 + (11 + 3α)τ + 4τ2)3
27(1 + τ)2(3 + α+ τ)(3 + α+ 2τ)2
(8)
2.2 Expanding free trade symmetrically: multilateral FTA
If both member countries of the bilateral FTA, N and M, introduce free trade with the third
country, S, we get a multilateral FTA. In our three-country setup, this is equivalent to global free
8This assumes a nonprohibitive tariff. It is straightforward to calculate the maximum τ at which the tariff would
become prohibitive. Trade between N and S (and M and S) occurs as long as p2(1 + τ) is smaller than the price of
good 2 in N (and M) in the absence of trade with S. The price of good 2 in the absence of trade with S is equal to
(2 + α)/2. This implies that τ should be less than τFTA = −1 + ((2 + 3α+ α2)/2)1/2.
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trade. Because of total endowments being identical, and because of Cobb-Douglas preferences
with equal weight on each good, all prices will be identical. After normalizing, we can say that
pji = 1 for i = 1, 2, 3 and j = N,S,M . The preferences imply that each country will consume one
third of the total endowment of each good:
cji = 1 + α/3 (9)
Each country thus exports α/3 of the good in which it has a comparative advantage to each one
of its trading partners. Trade between a pair of countries i and j as a share of their income is
then: (
xij
Ii
)multilateral
=
α/3
3 + α
(10)
Inserting the consumption levels (9) into the utility function gives the welfare levels of the repre-
sentative agents in all three countries j = N,M,S
(
uj
)multilateral = (3 + α
3
)3
(11)
2.3 Expanding free trade asymmetrically: hub-and-spoke
If instead of both countries introducing free trade with a third country, only one of them does
so, we have a hub-and-spoke configuration, where the hub, say M, has separate FTAs with the
spokes, N and S. Trade between the spokes continues to be limited by the presence of an MFN
tariff τ .
The two FTAs are subject to rules of origin (ROOs). Simple arbitrage is therefore not allowed:
M cannot import good 1 from N and re-export it to S. However, there exists the possibility of
indirect arbitrage: M can import good 1 from N to satisfy its own consumption, and export its
own endowment of good 1 to S. Although both goods are identical, the imports are “made in N”
and the exports are “made in M”. By symmetry, the same can happen with good 2.
The rules of origin are not always binding. ROOs are non binding if, at the price pM1 , the
demand for imports of good 1 in S is less than the endowment of good 1 in M. In that case, indirect
arbitrage eliminates all price differences across countries. In terms of prices and consumption
levels, the outcome replicates the multilateral FTA, which is why we say that the ROOs are non
binding.
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In contrast, ROOs are binding if at the price pM1 , the demand for imports of good 1 in S
is more than the endowment of good 1 in M. In that case, indirect arbitrage is not enough to
eliminate price differences; the price M pays for good 1 will be lower than the price it receives for
good 1. In what follows, we study these two cases in more detail.
Non binding rules of origin
If the ROOs are non binding, prices in the hub-and-spoke arrangement replicate those in the
multilateral FTA. To see this, we start by showing that there can never be a difference between
the price at which country i sells good j and the price at which i buys good j. Assume the export
price of good 1 in M were to be greater than the local price of good 1 in M, i.e., qM1 > p
M
1 . If
ROOs are non binding, part of the endowment of good 1 in M is not exported to S. Therefore, if
qM1 > p
M
1 , there is an arbitrage opportunity: it is possible to buy good 1 at price p
M
1 in M, and
sell it at price qM1 in S. In equilibrium, we must therefore have q
M
1 = p
M
1 . This insight can be
generalized to qji = p
j
i for all i and all j.
It is now easy to see that prices will be equal across countries. Arbitrage ensures that the
price of good 1 is the same in M and in S, i.e., pS1 = p
M
1 . Moreover, because of free trade between
M and N, the price of good 1 should also be the same in M and in N, so that pN1 = p
M
1 = p
S
1 . A
similar argument ensures that pN2 = p
S
2 = p
M
2 . Finally, because M exports good 3 to both N and
S, and because of the two FTAs, it follows that pN3 = p
S
3 = p
M
3 . Since the price of each good is
equal across the three countries, these prices replicate the outcome under the multilateral FTA.
Although this implies that consumption and utility are the same as in the multilateral FTA
case, trade flows are not. Indeed, this equilibrium is sustained through indirect arbitrage. As a
result, there is excess trade, compared to what would happen were there to be free trade across all
countries. Whereas the trade volume between N and M would be 13α under a multilateral FTA,
under the hub-and-spoke arrangement it is double:
xNM =
2
3
α (12)
This excess trade occurs because M does not only export 13α of good 3 (in which it has comparative
advantage) to N, but also 13α of good 2 (in which S has comparative advantage, but in which M
plays the role of an arbitrageur). In a multilateral FTA, the exports of good 2 by M to N would
disappear; instead, N would buy good 2 directly from S.
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The condition that makes ROOs non binding remains to be determined. As argued before,
ROOs do not bind if at a price pM1 , c
S
1 − 1 ≤ 1. Substituting pM1 by 1 and cS1 by (9) gives us the
following condition:
α ≤ 3
In other words, if comparative advantage is not too strong, the hub-and-spoke arrangement is
equivalent to a multilateral FTA in terms of consumption and welfare. It does so by having the
hub trade excessively with the spokes. However, if comparative advantage is sufficiently strong,
indirect arbitrage will not suffice to eliminate price differences across countries. We turn to this
case in the next subsection.
Binding rules of origin with nonprohibitive tariffs
When the ROOs are binding, the demand for imports of good 1 in S exceeds the endowment of
good 1 in M. As a result, the price of good 1 in S will be greater than in M: pS1 = q
M
1 > p
M
1 .
By symmetry, the price of good 2 in N will be greater than in M: pN2 = q
M
2 > p
M
2 . Since prices
of identical goods are different across countries, consumption (and welfare) will not replicate the
multilateral FTA outcome.
We start by simplifying prices. As in the bilateral FTA case, we assume MFN tariffs are
nonprohibitive, so that there will be positive trade between N and S. We normalize pN1 = p
S
2 = 1.
Because ROOs are binding, and tariffs are nonprohibitive, pN2 = q
M
2 = 1 + τ . By symmetry,
pS1 = q
M
1 = 1 + τ . Because of the two FTAs, p
M
1 = p
M
2 = 1. Since M freely exports good 3 to N
and S, we have pM3 = p
S
3 = p
N
3 . We can thus reduce the number of different prices to three:
pN1 = p
S
2 = p
M
1 = p
M
2 = 1
pN2 = p
S
1 = 1 + τ
pN3 = p
S
3 = p
M
3 = p3 (13)
Prices received by producers are typically the same as those paid by consumers, except for qM1 =
pS1 > p
M
1 and q
M
2 = p
N
2 > p
M
2 .
To determine the only unknown price p3 in (13), we use the trade balance condition between
N and M.9 Under binding rules of origin, M imports all of its consumption of good 1, cM1 , from
9Because of the symmetric setup, trade between each country pair must be balanced.
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N. In return, it exports to N all its endowment of good 2, in addition to cN3 − 1 units of good 3.
The trade balance between N and M is then:
cM1 = (1 + τ) + p3(c
N
3 − 1) (14)
Substituting the consumption levels into (14) allows us to solve out for p3:10
p3 =
3 + α+ 2τ
3 + α
(15)
For the purpose of comparative statics, we compute trade between the hub M and the spoke
N as a share of their incomes:(
xNM
IN
)hub−and−spoke
=
(3 + α)2 + 4(2 + α)τ
3((3 + α2) + (5 + α)τ)(
xNM
IM
)hub−and−spoke
=
1
3
(16)
The level of welfare enjoyed in each country is obtained by substituting the consumption levels
into the utility function (2):
(
uN
)hub−and−spoke
=
((3 + α)2 + (5 + α)τ)3
27(3 + α)2(3 + α+ 2τ)(1 + τ)(
uS
)hub−and−spoke
=
((3 + α)2 + (5 + α)τ)3
27(3 + α)2(3 + α+ 2τ)(1 + τ)(
uM
)hub−and−spoke
=
((3 + α)2 + 4(2 + α)τ)3
27(3 + α)2(3 + α+ 2τ)
(17)
3 Trade and welfare across regimes
We are interested in understanding how the volume of trade between a country pair changes
as free trade expands to a third country. As a starting point we assume the existence of a free
trade area between N and M. We then look at how trade between N and M changes, as one or
both countries liberalizes trade with S. In the first case, we have a hub-and-spoke arrangement;
in the second case, we have a multilateral FTA. Since prices depend on the different trading
configurations, for comparative statics purposes, we focus on trade as a share of GDP.
10We can now determine when τ is prohibitive. The idea is simple: the price at which N sells good 1 to S, 1 + τ ,
should not be greater than the price at which M sells good 1 to S when trade is prohibited between N and S. The
latter is equal to 4+5α+α
2
13+5α
. Using this information, it immediately follows that τ is prohibitive if it is greater than
τHS = α
2−9
13+5α
.
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3.1 Multilateral vs bilateral FTA
To compare the trade shares under a multilateral and a bilateral FTA between N and M, we
divide (10) by (7):(
xNM
IN
)multilateral
/
(
xNM
IN
)bilateral
=
α((3 + α)2 + (8 + 3α)τ + τ2)
(3 + α)(α2 + 3α(1 + τ) + τ(2 + τ))
(18)
The expression for M is identical. After some tedious algebra, which is omitted for brevity, one
can show that the numerator is greater than the denominator. This is enough to establish the
following
Proposition 1 Suppose there is a bilateral FTA between N and M, and a nonprohibitive MFN
tariff between N and S and between M and S. If both N and M introduce free trade with S, trade
between N and M as a share of income in N and M decreases.
This result is intuitive. Under the bilateral FTA arrangement, trade is unrestricted between N
and M, but not between either country and S. Moving to global free trade gives both N and M an
additional trading partner, thus reducing the volume of trade between them. This is reminiscent
of the Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) result. By liberalizing trade with a third country, trade
between N and M becomes relatively less free. This explains the drop in trade between them.
We can now compare welfare under the bilateral FTA and under global free trade. Relative
utility for both N and M is
(uN )multilateral
(uN )bilateral
=
(uM )multilateral
(uM )bilateral
=
(3 + α)3(1 + τ)(3 + α+ τ)(3 + α+ 2τ)2
((1 + τ)(3 + α+ τ) + (2 + α)(3 + α+ 2τ))3
(19)
If τ = 0, (19) is equal to 1. Differentiating (19) with respect to τ , and evaluating the expression
at τ = 0 gives
α(6 + 5α+ α2)
(3 + α)3
> 0
This implies that with a small enough tariff, welfare is higher under global free trade than under
bilateral free trade. This result is summarized in the following
Proposition 2 Suppose there is a bilateral FTA between N and M, and a sufficiently small
nonprohibitive MFN tariff between N and S and between M and S. If both N and M liberalize trade
with S, welfare increases in both N and M.
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3.2 Hub-and-spoke vs bilateral FTA
Instead of introducing a multilateral FTA, we now consider the consequences of creating a
hub-and-spoke arrangement with M being the hub and N and S the spokes. We take ROOs to be
binding, and tariffs to be nonprohibitive. In the case of N, we have:(
xNM
IN
)hub−and−spoke
/
(
xNM
IN
)bilateral
=
(3 + α)2 + 4(2 + α)τ)((3 + α)2 + (8 + 3α)τ + τ2)
((3 + α)2 + (5 + α)τ)(α2 + 3α(1 + τ) + τ(2 + τ))
(20)
After some tedious algebra,11 one can show that the numerator in (20) is greater than the denom-
inator. Thus, trade between N and M as a share of income in N increases when we move from a
bilateral FTA to a hub-and-spoke arrangement. Likewise, trade between N and M as a share of
income in M also increases. This is obvious from the following expression:(
xNM
IM
)hub−and−spoke
/
(
xNM
IM
)bilateral
= 1 +
3(3 + α+ 2τ)
α2 + 3α(1 + τ) + τ(2 + τ)
(21)
It is easy to show that the same result goes through if the ROOs are not binding. This allows us
to state the following proposition:
Proposition 3 Suppose there is free trade between N and M, and a nonprohibitive MFN tariff
between N and S and between M and S. If then M signs a free trade agreement with S, converting
M into a hub, the volume of trade between N and M as a share of income of N and M increases.
As argued before, the hub-and-spoke arrangement leads to excess trade between M (the hub)
and N (the spoke). Since M can play the role of indirect arbitrageur, trade between the two
increases, compared to a situation where there is only a bilateral FTA. In spite of relative trade
barriers going up, there is now more trade between N and M .
Expanding free trade to a third country has thus an ambiguous effect on bilateral trade. When
both N and M allow free trade with S, trade between N and M decreases. This is the message of
Proposition 1. However, if only M introduces free trade with S, trade between N and M increases.
This is the message of Proposition 3.
This excess trade arises because the exports of a spoke can be substituted by goods obtained
from the hub. By satisfying its own consumption of a certain good by imports from one of the
11The analytical derivation is available from the authors.
13
spokes, the hub frees up its endowment of that same good to export it to the other spoke. Going
back to our initial example, the hub imports coconuts “made in one of the spokes”, and exports
coconuts “made in the hub” to the other spoke.
One could argue that our result depends on both types of coconuts being perfect substitutes.
This is not the case though. In a more complex Krugman (1981) style model, with comparative
advantage at the sectoral level and monopolistic competition at the subsectoral level, the result
would still hold. Since varieties within the same sector are closer substitutes than varieties across
different sectors, the same mechanism would be at work. There is another reason why imports
and exports need not be perfect substitutes. Once we move from an exchange economy to a
production economy, it suffices for the factor content of the imports and the exports to be the
same. In that case, Cuba would import “coconut-intensive” goods produced in Venezuela, and
export home produced “coconut intensive” goods to Jamaica.
Note that the hub-and-spoke effect we describe depends on spokes having a comparative
advantage in different goods. If different spokes were to be ‘substitutes’ and export the same
goods, the excess trade would disappear. In that case there would be no room for indirect
arbitrage by the hub, and the standard effect reemerges. Expanding trade to a third country
raises relative trade barriers between the original country pair, leading to less trade between
them. This drop in trade occurs because the hub-and-spoke arrangement amounts to a de facto
multilateral FTA. Indeed, the hub-and-spoke configuration replicates a multilateral FTA, because
liberalization between all three does not lead to any trade between the spokes.
In the standard gravity equation models a` la Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) no excess
trade arises either. Liberalizing trade with third countries unequivocally leads to a drop in trade
between the original two. Most of those models use a one-sector framework with monopolistic
competition.12 Each variety is produced by only one country, and the elasticity of substitution
between all varieties is the same. The hub no longer disposes of relatively close substitutes of the
varieties of the spokes, because all varieties are equally substitutable. As a result, the possibility
of doing indirect arbitrage vanishes.
12An exception to this is Evenett and Keller (2002), who show how the gravity equation applies in a Heckscher-
Ohlin setting. However, as they point out, this only holds if each good is made by only one country.
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In terms of welfare, we can easily compare utility levels between the bilateral FTA and the
hub-and-spoke arrangement:
(uN )hub−and−spoke
(uN )bilateral
=
(3 + α+ τ)(3 + α+ 2τ)((3 + α)2 + (5 + α)τ)3
(3 + α)2((3 + α)2 + (8 + 3α)τ + τ2)3
(uM )hub−and−spoke
(uM )bilateral
=
(1 + τ)(3 + α+ τ)(3 + α+ 2τ)((3 + α)2 + 4(2 + α)τ)3
(3 + α)2((1 + τ)(3 + α+ τ) + (2 + α)(3 + α+ 2τ))3
(22)
Expanding the numerators and the denominators of the above fractions allows us to conclude the
following:
Proposition 4 Suppose there is free trade between N and M, and a nonprohibitive MFN tariff
between N and S and between M and S. Rules of origin bind. If M signs a free trade agreement
with S, converting M into a hub, welfare decreases in the spoke (N) and increases in the hub (M).
This proposition says that the formation of a hub-and-spoke arrangement benefits the hub
and hurts the spoke. This is not surprising. As the third country starts buying the hub’s exports,
the terms of trade of the hub improves, while those of the spoke worsen.
3.3 Hub-and-spoke vs multilateral FTA
Moving from a hub-and-spoke arrangement to a multilateral FTA lowers exports between N
and M as a share of their respective incomes. This is an immediate consequence of combining
Proposition 1 and Proposition 3. We therefore have:
Proposition 5 Suppose there is a hub-and-spoke arrangement, with free trade between M (hub)
and N and S (spokes), and a nonprohibitive MFN tariff between N and S. If free trade is introduced
between all three countries, the volume of trade between N and M as a share of income decreases.
Note that trade decreases for two reasons. On the one hand, expanding free trade leads to
a relative increase in trade barriers between N and M . On the other hand, the excess trade
happening through the hub disappears.
When comparing welfare, the effect on N (the spoke) is obvious from Propositions 2 and 4:
moving from a hub-and-spoke arrangement to a multilateral FTA, welfare in N increases. For M
(the hub), utility under the hub-and-spoke relative to the multilateral FTA is:
(uM )hub−and−spoke
(uM )multilateral
=
((3 + α)2 + 4(2 + α)τ)3
(3 + α)5(3 + α+ 2τ)
(23)
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Expanding numerator and denominator, it is straightforward to show that utility in M decreases
when going from hub-and-spoke to multilateral free trade. We therefore have the following result:
Proposition 6 Suppose there is a hub-and-spoke arrangement, with M being the hub and N and S
the spokes. Assume also that a small enough nonprohibitive MFN tariff is applied to trade between
N and S and that rules of origin bind. If free trade is introduced between all three countries, welfare
increases in the spokes (N and S) and decreases in the hub (M).
This proposition says that the introduction of multilateral free trade makes the hub lose its
privileged position, whereas the spoke now benefits from improved terms of trade, thanks to
expanded trade with the third country.
4 Evidence from Israel
“The agreements with the European Union, the United States and the EFTA countries
places Israel in the unique position of being a Free Trade Area partner with the world’s
main economic regions. Thus, Israel is able to bridge countries that do not have mutual
agreements...” Baker Tilly Oren - Horowitz & Co., Doing Business in Israel, 1995.
We are now ready to empirically assess the implications of our model. Our theory makes
two specific predictions. First, if both members of the original FTA expand free trade to a third
country, trade between the original pair should decline. Second, if only one of them signs a free
trade agreement with a third country, we get a hub-and-spoke arrangement, and trade between
the original pair should increase.
To empirically evaluate these predictions, we need to focus on countries that have signed
multiple free trade agreements with different partners at different times. Crucially, to be able to
disentangle the effects of each individual agreement, there should be a considerable time lag among
them, as the agreements are often implemented over long time periods and as a consequence their
effects need not be instantaneous. Although several countries are members to multiple free trade
areas — remember the ‘spaghetti bowl’ — the large majority of existing FTAs have been signed in
the last decade, making it very difficult to isolate their individual effects. The Israeli experience
is in this regard unique. Between 1975 and 1993 it signed three major free trade agreements,
with on average a decade elapsing between each one of them. For this reason Israel represents an
16
almost ideal ground to evaluate the predictions of our theory.
4.1 Israel’s trade policy
Three events have characterized Israeli trade policy in the last thirty years. In 1975 Israel
signed an FTA with the European Union. A decade later, in 1985, it signed a similar FTA
with the United States. Yet another decade later, in 1993, an FTA between Israel and EFTA
entered into force. Almost simultaneously the Uruguay round of multilateral trade negotiations
was concluded in 1994. In addition to the FTAs with the EU, the US and EFTA, Israel entered
into a potpourri of agreements in the late 1990s with Turkey, Canada, and Slovakia (in 1997),
the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovenia (in 1998) and Poland (in 1999). As it is difficult to
disentangle the trade effects of each one of the recently established free trade areas, we will limit
our analysis to the time period ending in 1997.
According to the 1975 FTA treaty between Israel and the EU all goods with the exception
of agricultural products were to be traded duty free. Although the implementation was not
completed until 1989, the EU abolished its tariffs and quotas on all industrial products by July
1977 (World Trade Organization 1999). The 1975 agreement has been replaced in 1995 by a
treaty of association between Israel and the EU. This further extended free trade to cover a list
of agricultural products.
The 1985 agreement between Israel and the United States was implemented over a ten year
period, coming into full operation by January 1st 1995. Duties on goods like airplane and motor
parts, electrical products, processed raw diamonds, soybeans and corn were eliminated immedi-
ately upon conclusion of the agreement. Duties on products specified in list A (including paper,
cigarettes, heavy mechanical equipment, computer parts, leather and shoes, cars and certain tex-
tile items) were phased out by January 1st 1989. Between 1990 and 1995 residual restrictions
were eliminated on textiles and clothing, chemicals and certain high tech products. Duties on
highly sensitive items, such as figs and cold-storage equipment, were also eliminated by January
1st 1995.
The FTA between Israel and EFTA was signed in 1993 and took effect in the same year. It
called for reciprocal free trade in most industrial goods (in particular, the goods in chapters 25
to 97 of the Harmonized System), and some agricultural products. Israel also signed additional
17
bilateral agreements with some EFTA countries, aimed at further promoting trade liberalization
in agriculture.13
Immediately following the 1993 EFTA agreement, the Uruguay round of multilateral negoti-
ations was concluded in 1994. As a result, Israel committed to: (i) bind 53% of all tariff lines,
including all agricultural lines;14 (ii) replace most quantitative restrictions on agricultural goods
with tariff-rate quotas, even if some of these continue to be extremely high;15 (iii) reduce domestic
support to agriculture by 12% between 1995 and 2005 and cut agricultural export subsidies by
similar amounts. These somewhat limited commitments to multilateral trade liberalization are
due to the developing country status enjoyed by Israel in several areas.
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Figure 1: Israel’s Free Trade Areas
To illustrate the relevance of the Israeli example for our theory, Figure 1 provides a graphical
representation of the different agreements Israel signed. As can be seen, the FTA with the US
turned Israel into a hub, and the European Union and the US into spokes. According to our
13For further details on Israel’s current trade policy see World Trade Organization (1999) and World Trade
Organization (2005).
14Currently, tariff bounds vary between 0 and 560% for agricultural goods and between 0 and 272% for manufac-
tured goods
15For example, the duty bounds for imports of bovine animal products are equal to 190%.
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model, this should have led to an increase in trade between Israel and the European Union. In
contrast, the FTA with EFTA amounted to the establishment of multilateral free trade between
Israel, EFTA and the EU. Our model predicts in this case a decrease in trade between Israel
and the European Union. As for the Uruguay round, it can be viewed as a move towards global
free trade. As a result, we would expect trade between Israel and its existing preferential trading
partners to decline.
4.2 Data
The data we use come from Rose (2004), and the sample covers the period between 1950 and
1997. Since our analysis focuses on Israel, we limit our attention to country pairs that involve
Israel. This gives us 47 years of observations and 138 country pairs. After accounting for missing
values, we are left with 3,755 observations.16
Table 1 summarizes key features of Israel’s trade activity. In this table we distinguish five
periods: Period 1 (1950-1974) predates any of Israel’s free trade agreements; Period 2 (1975-1984)
starts with the year of the EU-Israel agreement and concludes before the US-Israeli agreement;
Period 3 (1985-1992) starts with the US-Israel agreement and ends prior to the EFTA-Israel
agreement; Period 4 (1993-1994) starts with the EFTA-Israel agreement and finishes prior to the
departure of Austria, Sweden and Finland from EFTA and their accession to the EU; and Period
5 (1995-1997) are the remaining years of our sample. We also distinguish six different sets of
trade partners: EU-9, the nine member countries of the EU at the time of the formation of the
EU-Israel agreement; Greece-Spain-Portugal, the three Mediterranean countries that joined the
EU in 1981 and 1986, and thus became party to the EU-Israel free trade agreement; Austria-
Finland-Sweden, the three countries that left EFTA to join the EU in 1995, and thus terminated
one trade relationship with Israel to become party to another; Norway-Iceland-Switzerland, the
three countries that were party to the Israel-EFTA agreement from 1993 onwards; the United
States; and the rest of the world, with whom trade was further liberalized upon the conclusion of
the Uruguay round in 1994.
The first panel of Table 1 shows the average annual trade with each country group in each
16Aggregate, rather than sectoral, data is used because detailed country-pair sectoral data do not cover the
entire period of interest. Moreover, identifying the factor content of sectoral flows would add an additional layer of
complication (and possible source of modeling error) to the econometric analysis.
19
 Ta
bl
e 
1.
 
D
es
cr
ip
tiv
e 
St
at
is
tic
s
Pe
rio
d
EU
-
9
G
re
e
ce
-
Sp
a
in
-
Po
rtu
ga
l
Au
st
ria
-
Fi
n
la
n
d-
Sw
e
de
n
N
o
rw
a
y-
Ic
e
la
n
d-
Sw
itz
e
rla
n
d
Un
ite
d 
St
a
te
s
R
e
st
 
o
f t
he
 
W
o
rld
Av
e
ra
ge
 
Bi
la
te
ra
l T
ra
de
 
(m
illi
o
n
s 
o
f r
e
a
l $
)
19
50
-
19
74
7.
49
0.
28
0.
68
0.
74
4.
54
3.
01
19
75
-
19
84
22
.
11
1.
16
1.
67
3.
96
16
.
22
11
.
76
19
85
-
19
92
28
.
37
1.
89
1.
69
4.
77
23
.
46
15
.
37
19
93
-
19
94
36
.
29
2.
91
2.
35
5.
30
31
.
41
24
.
90
19
95
-
19
97
49
.
02
4.
57
2.
86
5.
46
38
.
95
33
.
04
Av
e
ra
ge
 
Bi
la
te
ra
l T
ra
de
 
(%
 
o
f I
sr
a
e
li t
ra
de
 
w
ith
 
a
ll c
o
u
n
tri
e
s 
in
 
th
e
 
co
rr
e
sp
o
n
di
n
g 
gr
o
u
p)
19
50
-
19
74
44
.
7%
1.
7%
4.
1%
4.
4%
27
.
1%
18
.
0%
19
75
-
19
84
38
.
9%
2.
0%
2.
9%
7.
0%
28
.
5%
20
.
7%
19
85
-
19
92
37
.
5%
2.
5%
2.
2%
6.
3%
31
.
1%
20
.
3%
19
93
-
19
94
35
.
2%
2.
8%
2.
3%
5.
1%
30
.
5%
24
.
1%
19
95
-
19
97
36
.
6%
3.
4%
2.
1%
4.
1%
29
.
1%
24
.
7%
Av
e
ra
ge
 
Tr
a
de
 
In
te
n
si
ty
 
(sc
a
le
 
fre
e
)
19
50
-
19
74
1.
86
1.
60
1.
76
1.
66
2.
12
1.
40
19
75
-
19
84
2.
03
1.
83
1.
88
1.
74
2.
28
1.
41
19
85
-
19
92
2.
05
1.
86
1.
87
1.
78
2.
32
1.
39
19
93
-
19
94
2.
09
1.
92
1.
91
1.
75
2.
35
1.
48
19
95
-
19
97
2.
11
1.
96
1.
94
1.
77
2.
38
1.
52
N
u
m
be
r 
o
f O
bs
e
rv
a
tio
n
s
19
50
-
19
74
16
8
70
72
72
24
1,
19
1
19
75
-
19
84
70
30
30
30
10
75
2
19
85
-
19
92
56
24
24
24
8
57
9
19
93
-
19
94
14
6
6
6
2
16
3
19
95
-
19
97
23
9
9
9
3
27
1
N
o
te
s:
 
Tr
a
de
 
a
n
d 
Tr
a
de
 
In
te
n
si
ty
 
a
re
 
u
n
w
e
ig
ht
e
d 
a
ve
ra
ge
s 
a
cr
o
ss
 
th
e
 
co
u
n
tri
e
s 
a
n
d 
ye
a
rs
 
th
a
t c
o
rr
e
sp
o
n
d 
to
 
e
a
ch
 
ce
ll.
 
Th
e
 
sc
a
le
-
fre
e
 
m
e
a
su
re
 
o
f T
ra
de
 
In
te
n
si
ty
 
fo
r 
a
 
gi
ve
n
 
co
u
n
try
 
pa
ir 
is
 
e
qu
a
l t
o
 
th
e
 
ra
tio
 
o
f b
ila
te
ra
l t
ra
de
 
di
vid
e
d 
by
 
th
e
 
sq
u
a
re
 
ro
o
t o
f t
he
 
pr
o
du
ct
 
o
f c
o
u
n
try
 
G
D
Ps
.
 
D
a
rk
 
sh
a
de
d 
ce
lls
 
co
rr
e
sp
o
n
d 
to
 
th
e
 
e
xi
st
e
n
ce
 
o
f b
ila
te
ra
l t
ra
de
 
a
gr
e
e
m
e
n
ts
 
be
tw
e
e
n
 
Is
ra
e
l a
n
d 
th
e
 
co
rr
e
sp
o
n
di
n
g 
co
u
n
tri
e
s.
 
Li
gh
tly
 
sh
a
de
d 
ce
lls
 
in
di
ca
te
 
e
xi
st
e
n
ce
 
o
f 
a
gr
e
e
m
e
n
t d
u
rin
g 
o
n
ly 
pa
rt 
o
f t
ha
t p
e
rio
d 
(G
re
e
ce
 
joi
n
e
d 
th
e
 
EU
 
a
n
d 
he
n
ce
 
be
ca
m
e
 
pa
rty
 
to
 
a
 
tra
de
 
a
gr
e
e
m
e
n
t w
ith
 
Is
ra
e
l s
ta
rti
n
g 
in
 
19
81
,
 
Sp
a
in
 
a
n
d 
Po
rtu
ga
l jo
in
e
d 
th
e
 
EU
 
a
n
d 
th
u
s 
a
ls
o
 
be
ca
m
e
 
pa
rty
 
to
 
a
 
a
gr
e
e
m
e
n
t w
ith
 
Is
ra
e
l in
 
19
86
).
20
period. The volume of trade has been growing rapidly with all partners, and that with the EU-9
appears to be the single largest. Trade with the US is the second most important in terms of
volume, followed by that with the rest of the world. The second panel of Table 1 reports the share
of Israeli trade with each of the regions during each of the time periods we consider. These shares
not only better reflect the importance of Israeli trade with these regions because they account for
overall increase in Israeli trade volume.
Maybe of greater importance than the volume of trade (or the group’s percentage share of
Israeli trade) is the trade intensity of Israel with its different partners. We define the trade
intensity between countries i and j in year t as Tradeijt/((GDPitGDPjt)0.5 where Tradeijt is the
volume of trade and GDPit is Gross Domestic Product of country i in year t (and similarly for
country j). Note that this measure is scale-free.17 The third panel of Table 1 reports the evolution
of the trade intensity, reporting the average value of trade intensity for countries within each group
for each of the time periods. As can be seen, the trade intensity with the EU-9 increased in the
period 1975-1984, following the Israel-EU FTA, and rose further in the early 1990s. The trade
intensity with Greece-Spain-Portugal followed a similar (though a bit more gradual) pattern,
likely because these countries joined the EU in two different years. As for the trade intensity
with Austria-Finland-Sweden and Norway-Iceland-Switzerland, it also increased over time, but
by a lesser amount than in the first two groups. Moreover, the Israel-EFTA agreement seemed to
have had little or no effect on the trade intensity with those countries. The trade intensity with
the US increased the slowest over our sample period, though the US-Israel agreement seemed to
have provided a small boost. Finally, the trade intensity with the rest of the world was roughly
constant until 1993, at which point it increased sharply following the conclusion of the Uruguay
round.
To determine whether these descriptive statistics are consistent with our theoretical framework,
formal econometric analysis is necessary. It is essential to control for overall changes in the
propensity to trade, and to estimate (rather than impose) the elasticity between output and
trade. Moreover, statistical analysis will allow us to disentangle trade effects that are due to the
subsequent addition of spokes and those that are due to delays or lags in the trade effects of earlier
17Other recent research defines trade intensity by the ratio Tradeijt/((GDPitGDPjt) for the purpose of generating
a dependent variable that incorporates the gravity restriction of unitary elasticity of trade volume with respect to
a trading partner’s GDP (see, for instance, Baier and Bergstrand (2006)). This measure is not scale-free, and thus
not appropriate as a summary descriptive measure of trade intensity.
21
agreements.
4.3 Econometric methodology
Our econometric model adopts a differences-in-differences treatment effects approach in iden-
tifying the effect of trade agreements. Our dependent variable is log of bilateral trade, while as
independent variables we incorporate country pair fixed effects, year fixed effects, a number of
treatment variables (trade agreement dummies), and the log of the product of the trade partners’
GDPs. The inclusion of both year and pair fixed effects allows us to identify the effect of the dif-
ferent Israeli trade agreements on trade between the countries that are members of a preferential
trade agreement. Say we want to measure the effect of the Israel-EU agreement of 1975 on trade
between Israel and the EU. In that case, we would estimate how trade between Israel and the EU
member states changed before and after 1975, relative to how trade between Israel and all other
countries changed before and after 1975. When doing so, we control for changes in the GDPs of
the two countries.
The use of year and country pair fixed effects allows us to address a number of concerns.
Year fixed effects account for any possible changes over time in Israeli trade with the rest of
the world. Country pair fixed effects control for any permanent features of Israel’s trade partners
that may affect trade between them: physical distance, transportation, culture, immigration links,
and others. Furthermore, country pair dummies also address a possible endogeneity concern. If
free trade agreements are systematically related with unobserved country (or country pair)18
characteristics, the coefficients of agreement dummies would yield biased estimates of the true
effects of these agreements if country pair dummies were not included.19,20 A remaining concern
is time-varying endogeneity. However, we discuss later why this is not likely to be an issue, and
in fact is inconsistent with our results.
Exclusively focusing on country pairs that involve Israel removes possible confounding effects.
18Given that we focus exclusively on country pairs that involve Israel, country pair dummies are the same as
country dummies.
19See Baier and Bergstrand (2006) and Baltagi, Egger, and Pfaffermayr (2003) for a further discussion.
20Notice that in what follows we estimate agreement effects for particular country pairs, and thus make no claim
on the effect of any future trade agreements of Israel. Thus, our analysis is not subject to the critique that current
agreements may provide upward biased predictions for the effects of future agreements because Israel selected its
early agreements amongst the most promising set of candidates.
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Year dummies now reflect only the secular change in Israeli trade, rather than the average secular
change between any country pair. Likewise, the GDP elasticities measure the impact of GDP
changes on Israeli trade, rather than a global average. Moreover, using only country pairs that
include Israel does away with any possible effects from not correctly accounting for all trade
agreements between third countries. Given the large number of observations per year that involve
Israel, any associated loss of efficiency from omitting non-Israeli flows would be minimal, and
would likely be overwhelmed from biases arising from the above factors.
Given the likely differences in variability in country flows across partners and years and the
resulting likely serial correlation in the error process, we adopt the recommendations of Bertrand,
Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004) for obtaining appropriate standard errors. In particular, we
compute standard errors with the two approaches that have been shown by Bertrand et al. (2004)
to perform best for treatment effects panel data: (i) using White’s heteroskedasticity consistent
covariance matrix, adjusted for taking arbitrary within panel correlation into consideration, and
(ii) using a covariance matrix based on block bootstrap in which entire histories of countries are
sampled with replacement.21 The two sets of standard errors are very similar, within ten percent
of each other, with those based on the block bootstrap generally being the larger of the two. The
only exception are the parameter estimates for the United States agreements, which are 50 to 80
percent higher under the bootstrap.22 In the tables, we report the more conservative bootstrap
standard errors and tests.
4.4 Results
Effects of FTAs on member countries
21We have also supplemented these with AR(1)-GLS estimation in some of the analysis, which is a third but
less well performing approach discussed in Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004). Statistical significance of
the hub-and-spoke effects is somewhat reduced compared to the levels reported here, and ranges, depending on
specification, from approximately the 5 to the 10 percent level.
22We have used 20,000 replications to compute the block bootstrap covariance matrix. Standard errors for
individual countries are computed from the subset of replications in which that individual country is included in the
bootstrap sample. Covariances between two country dummy variables (and by extension test statistics involving
multiple parameters) are computed from the subset of replications in which both countries are included in the
bootstrap sample. To ensure that our estimates are precise, we computed two additional sets of block bootstrap
standard errors and chi-squared statistics using different random number seeds. Standard errors are generally
within ±0.001 of each other and chi-squared statistics within 2% of each other across the three sets of replications.
Chi-squared test significance does not depend on the choice of bootstrap covariance variance.
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We start by analyzing the direct effect of FTAs on trade flows between Israel and the member
countries. In other words, we estimate the average percentage increase in trade flows due to each
of Israel’s three trade agreements (EU, US and EFTA) relative to pre-agreement levels. We control
for changes in the trade flows with non-agreement countries and changes in economic activity. In
particular, we estimate the model
log(Tradeijt) = βEUFTAijtEUjt + βUSFTAijtUSj + βEFTAFTAijtEFTAjt (24)
+α log(GDPiGDPj) + uij + vt + eijt
where FTAijt is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if there is a free trade agreement
in effect between Israel (country i) and country j in year t, EUjt takes the value of 1 if country
j is a member of the EU in year t, USj is an indicator variable for the United States, EFTAjt
takes the value of 1 if country j is a member of EFTA in year t, uij are country pair fixed effects,
vt are year fixed effects, and eijt is a random variable that captures transient factors that affect
trade.
The results, which are reported in Table 2 (Model 1), show that both the EU and the US trade
agreements led to a considerable increase in bilateral trade flows with Israel. Compared to the
period before 1975, trade with the EU went up 81% after the signing of the Israel-EU agreement
(e0.5953−1 ≈ 0.81). In the case of the US, the effect of the 1985 FTA was even bigger: trade went
up by 96% (e0.6719 − 1 ≈ 0.96). In contrast, the Israel-EFTA trade agreement of 1993 appears
to have had a negative (though not statistically significant at the 5% level) effect on trade. The
reason for this is likely to have been the overall trade liberalization with the rest of world due
to the successful conclusion of the Uruguay round in 1994. As is well known (see Hoekman and
Kostecki 2001) the effect of the Uruguay round was to lead developing countries to increase the
average share of tariffs line bound by WTO rules from 22% to 72%, while transition economies
increased the share of bound items from 73% to 98% and developed countries from 78% to 99%.
As a result, the trade liberalization effect of the Uruguay round on trade between Israel and the
rest of the world is likely to have been greater than the effect of the Israel-EFTA agreement on
trade between Israel and the EFTA countries. This is consistent with the figures in Table 1. The
trade intensity between Israel and the rest of the world grew strongly after 1993, not only in
absolute terms, but also relative to its trade with other countries. It is this relative growth which
can explain the negative coefficient on trade with EFTA.
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Hub-and-spoke effects of FTAs
In Table 2 (Model 2) we assess the existence of hub-and-spoke effects of the US-Israel FTA,
and further analyze the effects of the EFTA-Israel agreement and the conclusion of the Uruguay
round. In particular, we allow for the EU-Israel trade agreement to have a different impact on
bilateral trade in the 1975-1984 period (during which Israel had no other agreements), in the
1985-1992 period (during which Israel had a second trade agreement with the US), and in the
1993-1997 period (during which Israel added an agreement with EFTA and liberalized trade with
the rest of world). Similarly, for the US-Israel agreement we distinguish between 1985-1992 and
1993-1997. The estimated model is
log(Tradeijt) = FTAijtEUjt[βEU1It∈[75−84] + βEU2It∈[85−92] + βEU3It∈[93−97]] (25)
+FTAijtUSj [βUS2It∈[85−92] + βUS3It∈[93−97]] + βEFTAFTAijtEFTAjt
+α log(GDPiGDPj) + uij + vt + eijt
where It∈[y1−y2] are indicator variables that take the value of 1 if the year is between y1 and y2.
The agreement between Israel and the US in 1985 turned Israel into a hub, and the EU and
the US into spokes. According to Proposition 3, we would expect this to have increased trade
between Israel and the EU. Our estimates support this view. The coefficient on EU-Israel trade
increased from 0.5235 for the period 1975-1984 to 0.7762 for the period 1985-1992. This implies
an increase in EU-Israel trade by 29% between these two periods (e0.7762−0.5235 − 1 ≈ 0.29).
The subsequent further liberalization between Israel and EFTA in 1993 amounted to a move
towards more ‘global’ free trade between Israel and the EU. Indeed, since the EU already had an
agreement with EFTA, dating back to 1973, the FTA between Israel and EFTA led to multilateral
free trade between the three of them. Consistent with Proposition 5, this should imply a decrease
in trade between Israel and the EU. Note that we expect the conclusion of the Uruguay round in
1994 to have had similar effects. By liberalizing trade with the rest of the world, it can likewise
be interpreted as a move towards more ‘global’ free trade. As suggested by Proposition 1, this
should reduce trade between existing members of FTAs, such as between Israel and the EU or
between Israel and the US. These predictions are borne out by our regressions. The coefficient on
EU-Israel trade fell from 0.7762 for the period 1985-1992 to 0.4519 for the period 1993-1997. This
amounts to a 28% drop in trade. US-Israel trade also fell after 1993, by a similar proportion.
26
To test for the joint significance of the hub-and-spoke effects, we test for the constancy of
parameters across periods for each of the trade agreements (i.e., whether βEU1 = βEU2 = βEU3
and βUS2 = βUS3). We find that the hub-and-spoke effects are statistically significant at the 5
percent level.
Delayed effects of FTAs
One may be concerned that the increase in EU-Israel trade following the US-Israel agreement
is driven by the delayed effect of the EU-Israel agreement, and not by hub-and-spoke effects.
In Table 2 (Model 3) we test for this possibility by removing the hub-and-spoke effects, and
replacing them by delayed free trade agreement effects. In particular, we allow the effect of a
trade agreement to be different in the first 5 years after its formation and in the subsequent years.
This yields the specification
log(Tradeijt) = FTAijtEUjt[βEU1It∈[75−79] + βEU2It∈[80−97]] (26)
+FTAijtUSj [βUS2It∈[85−89] + βUS3It∈[90−97]] + βEFTAFTAijtEFTAjt
+α log(GDPiGDPj) + uij + vt + eijt
The estimates show that delayed effects are not important, and of the “wrong” sign in the case
of the US-Israel agreement. In any event, they are not jointly statistically significant on the basis
of a chi-squared test of βEU1 = βEU2 and βUS2 = βUS3. This conclusion is not affected if we
distinguish between the first 3 and the subsequent years of a trade agreement.
Hub-and-spoke and delayed effects of FTAs
In Table 2 (Model 4) we incorporate both delayed effects and hub-and-spoke effects by appro-
priately partitioning the time periods using the regression
log(Tradeijt) = FTAijtEUjt[βEU1It∈[75−79] + βEU2It∈[80−84] + βEU3It∈[85−89] (27)
+βEU4It∈[90−92] + βEU5It∈[93−97]]
+FTAijtUSj [βUS3It∈[85−89] + βUS4It∈[90−92] + βUS5It∈[93−99]]
+βEFTAFTAijtEFTAjt + α log(GDPiGDPj) + uij + vt + eijt
The delayed effects are not significant, but the hub-and-spoke effects remain so. In fact, their
27
statistical significance is at the 1.33% level.23 Moreover, the hub-and-spoke parameter estimates
remain essentially unchanged from those in Model 2: the effect of the formation of the US-Israel
trade agreement on EU-Israel trade is similar in the two models, and so are the effects of the
EFTA-Israel FTA and the conclusion of the Uruguay round on Israel-EU and Israel-US trade.
Notice that this pattern of results is inconsistent with any plausible correlation of time varying
unobservable variables with the formation of the trade agreements (time constant unobservables
are absorbed by the country-pair fixed effects). The concern with time-varying endogeneity is
that a pair of countries sign an agreement when the trade propensity between them is likely to
become stronger anyway. If that were the case, then the parameter estimates of Model 3 would
exhibit negative delayed effects, in the sense that the effect of an FTA on bilateral trade would
be strong initially, but weaken over time. This is certainly not the case. Moreover, time varying
endogeneity would be a concern for our hub-and-spoke parameter estimates reported in Model 2
(and also 4) if Israel signs an agreement with a country when the trade propensity with countries
subject to prior agreements becomes stronger; this is a truly unlikely proposition (and if it were
true, it would render our theory untestable).
Changing membership of EU and EFTA
One possible confounding factor in the above analysis is that membership of the EU and EFTA
changed over time. If the effects of a free trade agreement between Israel and other countries vary
by country, then changes in the effect of a trade agreement between Israel and the EU (or EFTA)
may be driven by changes in the composition of the members of the EU (or EFTA). To examine
the empirical relevance of this issue, we re-estimate variants of the four models described above,
keeping the composition of the EU and EFTA fixed. In particular, we distinguish between the nine
members of the EU as of 1975 (henceforth denoted as EU9), the three Mediterranean countries
that joined the EU in 1981 and 1986 (Greece, Spain, and Portugal, henceforth denoted as MEDIT),
the United States, and the six countries that were members of EFTA in 1993 (henceforth denoted
as EFTA6). The first regression, which parallels (24), estimates the average (over time) effect of
23The statistical significance of delayed effects is obtained from the chi-squared of the joint test of the following
three parameter restrictions: βEU1 = βEU2 and βEU3 = βEU4 and βUS3 = βUS4. The statistical significance of the
hub-and-spoke effects is obtained from the chi-squared of the joint test of the following three parameter restrictions:
βEU2 = βEU3 and βEU4 = βEU5 and βUS4 = βUS5.
28
free trade agreements of Israel with each of these country groups, and is given by
log(Tradeijt) = βEU9FTAijtEU9j + βMEDITFTAijtMEDITj + βUSFTAijtUSj (28)
+βEFTA6FTAijtEFTA6j + α log(GDPiGDPj) + uij + vt + eijt
where EU9j is an indicator variable for the nine members of the EU as of 1975, MEDITj is an
indicator variable for Greece, Spain, and Portugal, EFTAj is an indicator variable for the six
EFTA members as of 1993, and the other variables are as defined previously. Notice that the
country group indicator variables are no longer indexed by t, as they are of constant composition
over time. When comparing Model 1 in Table 3 to Model 1 in Table 2, the results are very similar.
This suggests that our previous results are not due to changes in the composition of the EU and
EFTA.
The second regression reported in Table 3 parallels equation (25) in that the effect of trade
agreements are allowed to vary as new major agreements are signed between Israel and other
parties. As can be seen in Table 3 Model 2, the break points are the same as those of equation
(25).24 The pattern of coefficients is similar to that of Table 2 Model 2: the effect of the FTA
with EU9 is economically and statistically significant for the 1975-1984 period, increases with
the formation of the Israel-US agreement (which coincides with the Israel agreement with Spain
and Portugal), and decreases in 1993 with the formation of the Israel-EFTA agreement (which
coincides with the conclusion of the Uruguay round). The effect of the trade agreement with
the US is strong but declines after the formation of the 1993 agreements, while that with Spain,
Greece, and Portugal is constant throughout the period. The hub-and-spoke effects are jointly
statistically significant, even more so than in the results reported in Table 2.
The third and fourth regressions reported in Table 3 parallel those of Model 3 and 4 in Table
2 and examine the possibility that these results are driven by delayed effects of the different trade
agreements. The parameter estimates and tests of these two regressions show lagged agreement
effects are not statistically significant, neither when they are on their own nor when they are
estimated jointly with the hub-and-spoke effects. In contrast, the hub-and-spoke effects remain
statistically significant when estimated jointly with lagged effects.
24In other words, we do not treat the entry of Greece and of Spain and Portugal in 1981 and 1986, respectively,
as distinct events. The reason is that the entry of Greece is very insignificant, and that of Spain and Portugal is
only one year later than the far more important US-Israel agreement.
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5 Conclusions
In this paper we have developed a simple framework to study the effects on trade volumes and
welfare of membership in multiple free trade agreements when countries differ in their comparative
advantage. We have considered two main scenarios, starting from an initial configuration in which
two countries are member of a free trade arrangement, while trade with third parties is restricted
by means of a non-prohibitive MFN tariff. In the first scenario, one country turns into a hub by
becoming member of multiple free trade agreements, while the other becomes a spoke. In this
case trade between the hub and the spoke increases, while welfare rises in the hub and falls in the
spoke. In the second scenario, both countries sign a free agreement with a third party. In this
case we have a multilateral free trade area, and trade between the two original member countries
decreases, while welfare increases in both.
We have then brought our model to the data, using Israel as a case study. Israel’s experience
fits our model well because this country has been active in using bilateral agreements as a tool
to expand its trade flows since the early seventies. Furthermore, Israel’s decisions to enter its
various agreements are far enough apart in time to allow us to disentangle their individual effects.
Our empirical analysis finds robust evidence suggesting that the Israel-US free trade agreement of
1985 turned the country into a hub, as was hoped for by the Israeli business groups that favored
this initiative.
The analysis carried out in the paper can be extended in several directions. On the theory
side, the model could be generalized to include an arbitrary number of countries that differ in their
comparative advantage. On the empirical side, when longer time series on trade flows become
available, it should be interesting to look for hub-and-spoke effects using disaggregate industry-
level data. Finally, as the ‘spaghetti bowl’ has become an increasingly relevant phenomenon in
the last few years, in the near future more countries are likely to exhibit a pattern similar to
Israel, and a more general study of the phenomenon will be feasible.
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